The FAA has decided the Boeing 737 MAX missed-approach navigation glitch is not an 'unsafe condition' so it will not issue an Airworthiness Directive requiring airlines to modify aircraft or change procedures. Instead, Boeing will issue pilot guidance and the FAA will circulate a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin, or SAIB, to US operators and foreign regulators.
The decision removes the immediate regulatory obstacle that had paused 737 MAX 10 certification. It does not certify the MAX 10 by itself. Boeing must still complete the remaining certification work and the FAA must approve the aircraft on its own merits.
The issue can arise after a missed approach, or go-around, when a crew changes the pre-programmed flight path. In that specific sequence, the flight-management computer can cause vertical-navigation mode, VNAV, to disengage, leaving pilots without that layer of automated vertical guidance on a subsequent approach.
The FAA’s Corrective Action Review Board concluded the problem is not a flight-safety concern because pilots retain full control of the aircraft and the cockpit indications are 'clear and unambiguous'. The agency’s assessment is therefore that trained crews can recognise the condition and use established procedures rather than being left with an unannounced loss of control or ambiguous automation behaviour.
That is an important distinction. The finding is not that the software works as intended. It is that the failure mode, as currently understood, does not cross the FAA’s threshold for mandatory safety action.
An Airworthiness Directive is legally enforceable. It is issued under the FAA’s Part 39 authority when the agency finds an unsafe condition exists, or is likely to exist or develop, in a product of a particular type design, and that condition is likely to exist or develop in other aircraft of the same design. An AD can require an inspection, modification, flight-manual change, operating limitation or grounding action.
An SAIB is different. It communicates non-mandatory safety information or recommended practices; operators may choose their method of compliance, though airlines generally treat FAA guidance and manufacturer bulletins seriously in operational training and manuals. The FAA’s October 3 SAIB 2026-17 explicitly categorises the guidance as informational and says the condition does not currently warrant an AD.
The regulator’s test is not whether a defect is embarrassing, inconvenient or capable of increasing workload. It is whether the defect creates an unsafe condition that needs compulsory, fleet-wide action to maintain an acceptable safety margin.
The FAA initially delayed the MAX 10 decision while its experts reviewed the issue. That pause mattered. The agency did not accept Boeing’s initial assessment as sufficient, and said certification would wait until it was satisfied the bug was not a safety-of-flight issue.
The review ultimately relied on three points. Pilots retain direct control of pitch and flight path. Flight-deck cues identify the loss of VNAV automation clearly. Existing procedures allow crews to continue safely with a lower level of automation or manual control.
Boeing’s bulletin is expected to tell airlines how crews can recognise the VNAV condition and respond following a go-around and route amendment. The FAA’s SAIB will reinforce that advice among US airlines and overseas regulators.
Operators using the affected U14.0 or U14.1 flight-management software should ensure the bulletin reaches line pilots, training departments, dispatch and flight-operations management. Airlines will also need to decide whether to retain the software version, alter procedures, increase simulator coverage for the scenario or wait for Boeing’s eventual software correction.
The FAA’s finding clears a specific certification hurdle. The agency had stated that it would not certify the MAX 10 until it resolved whether the navigation anomaly was a safety issue. That condition has now been met.
For Boeing, the practical relief is significant. The issue has moved from a potential mandatory fleet-wide correction and a certification stop to a managed operational issue. One that pilots are expected to recognise and handle while the company develops a software solution.