An airline can borrow money, lease an aircraft and buy another departure slot. It cannot borrow tomorrow’s sleep for today’s crew. Captain C. S. Randhawa’s objection to extending India’s pilot-duty dispensations puts that distinction before the Civil Aviation Ministry.
In an October 21 letter, the Federation of Indian Pilots president called for the immediate withdrawal of relaxations extended beyond October 31, 2026, towards March 2027. His argument is not merely that pilots deserve better working conditions. It is that airline manpower planning must accommodate safety requirements, rather than safety requirements accommodating airline manpower planning.
“Aviation safety must not be compromised to accommodate deficiencies in airline operational planning,” he wrote.
Well this is not a regulatory finding but the Federation of Indian Pilots is the largest representative body of the pilots. The letter points towards understaffing. It does, however, ask questions that cannot be answered with an assurance that operations remain within approved limits. Indian Pilots Guild, Indian Commercial Pilots Association and Airline Pilots Association have also raised similar concerns.
Randhawa wants the ministry to disclose the legal basis for the extension, examine compliance with court directions and review the last two DGCA meetings. He also seeks independent verification of pilot availability, independent fatigue-risk assessments, stronger enforcement and consultation with pilot organisations.
Airlines have an interest in preserving their schedules. Pilots have an interest in the conditions under which they operate them. The regulator’s job is to establish the facts between those positions, not simply average their preferences.
A total headcount of pilots says little unless it establishes who is qualified, current and available for the relevant aircraft and duty. Randhawa’s demand for verification should therefore produce a practical account of staffing, not a comforting aggregate. What coverage remains after training, leave and other absences? How much reserve exists when the planned day unravels?
The same scrutiny should happen in the fatigue assessment. The question should not stop at whether an assignment fits inside a permitted limit.
This is why an exception needs an exit plan. If five additional months are justified, what must airlines accomplish during them? How many pilots must be recruited or qualified? Which roster practices must change? Will schedules be reduced if the required capacity is unavailable? A March deadline without measurable obligations risks becoming another date from which to request an extension.
The time-zones changes needs to be evaluated. Even simulator training is work, not a night’s sleep. American rulemaking expressly includes simulator training before a flight, without intervening required rest, within the flight-duty framework. No carrier is immune to say that simulator training is not flying.
EASA identifies night work, irregular schedules, long duties and time-zone changes as fatigue risks, and warns that compliance with limits alone is insufficient. Reporting, monitoring and roster design must accompany the arithmetic.
How fatigue is measured internationally for the next roster? American passenger operations, Part 117 requires at least ten consecutive hours’ rest before reserve or flight duty, providing eight uninterrupted hours of sleep opportunity. It also requires 30 consecutive hours free from duty within the preceding 168 hours. Crucially, an airline may not continue assigning flight duty after a pilot reports being too fatigued to continue safely.
Airlines have to train their rostering staff. Better management, therefore, means protecting 'recovery', not merely finding an unused square on the roster. Publish duties early enough to plan sleep, examine repeated disruptive patterns, maintain reserves and let fatigue reports change assignments. EASA explicitly rejects pressure to work fatigued or routinely stretch duties through commander’s discretion.
Indian pilots deserve credible fatigue protection and the regulator cannot exempt that. If the schedule cannot be flown within the intended safeguards, it is the schedule that must give way. If staffing cannot support a schedule, then fly fewer flights. The commercial inconvenience should remain with the company rather than be transferred to the cockpit and should not take a toll on the pilot's health that translates into raising flight safety.
India cannot allow such a huge diversion in aviation safety standards. The airlines should also work in tandem with safety standards rather than making schedules that compromise safety standards.