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Russian And Brazilian Jets Compete For India

India’s aerospace choice is no longer just about buying aircraft. It is about deciding which industrial dependencies it is prepared to manufacture at home.

Air Defence Desk|Saturday 3 October 2026|5 min read
Russian And Brazilian Jets Compete For India

C390

Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation says it has completed more than 80% of a licensing agreement that would allow Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to produce, sell and support the SJ-100 regional jet in India. UAC hopes to sign the licence soon and secure a first Indian operator agreement at Aero India 2027.

Meanwhile, Embraer and Mahindra have selected Nagpur for a potential C-390 Millennium final-assembly line. The project is contingent on the Indian Air Force selecting the Brazilian tanker-transport for its Medium Transport Aircraft requirement and placing an order; it is not yet a funded factory.

The two decisions should not be conflated. The SJ-100 is an attempt to create an Indian regional-airliner production and support system. The C-390 proposal is tied to a military acquisition competition for 60 aircraft intended to replace ageing An-32 and Il-76 capacity.

The SJ-100 engine question is whether an Indian-produced SJ-100 would be expected to use Russia’s PD-8 turbofan rather than the French-Russian SaM146 fitted to earlier Superjet 100 aircraft. UAC describes the new aircraft as an import-substituted design with Russian engines, avionics, landing gear, auxiliary power unit and other systems.

That is the central risk as well as the central selling point. The PD-8 was developed to replace Western components after sanctions disrupted Russia’s access to foreign equipment and support. Russia completed certification testing in 2026 and expected SJ-100 certification later that year, but serial production is reported to be expected only from 2027.

For India, the important distinction is between an engine that has completed testing and an engine with a mature global support record. Airlines judge a powerplant by dispatch reliability, on-wing time, shop-visit capacity, spare-engine availability, life-limited-part supply, repair costs and residual value, not by test completion alone.

Russia’s promise is strategic autonomy from Western suppliers. India must establish whether it would instead exchange one dependency for a younger, narrower one.

The SJ-100 faces a challenge that goes beyond certification. Modern airliner fleets depend on a financial ecosystem as much as an engineering one such as aircraft lessors, insurers, reinsurers, lenders, export-credit support, maintenance reserves and internationally accepted residual values.

A Russian-designed aircraft built in India could be easier to support domestically than one imported directly from Russia. But local assembly alone would not automatically resolve sanctions screening by foreign insurers, US-dollar banks, global lessors or manufacturers of any remaining foreign-origin components.

The C-390 and C-130J-30 are competing for the same Indian requirement but offer different industrial and operational propositions. Embraer’s C-390 is a newer twinjet design. Lockheed Martin’s C-130J is a mature turboprop family already operated by the IAF, with Tata Advanced Systems proposed as the Indian industrial partner.

The choice will turn on more than payload and runway performance. India will weigh commonality with its existing C-130J fleet, tactical-field capability, operating cost, availability, local assembly depth, technology access, delivery schedule and ability to sustain the fleet in wartime.

The Russian and Brazilian proposals are competing for different customers, but they place the same question before New Delhi. Does local production create resilient aviation capability or merely relocate final assembly?

For the SJ-100, the burden of proof lies with the PD-8’s maturity, parts availability, certification, insurability and leaseability. For the C-390, the issue is whether a Nagpur line becomes a genuine Indian aerospace hub or remains a contingent promise attached to a tender.

India can turn both proposals into leverage. It should demand binding commitments on supply chains, MRO, spares, financing, export rights and technology transfer before choosing an aircraft, or a factory.

Source: interfax/embraer

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